In choosing the Iraqi democracy

The two-day conference entitled The Iraqi Paradox: Self-determination under Occupation, had several impressions on its audience.

Although the discussion on the remnants of Arab nationalism and the revival of Shiite authority was rather theoretical and sweeping in approach, Chibli Mallat made a relevant point that Arab ties to the Umma (Nation) must look toward transcending religious, sectarian, or other communal divisions in a more participatory form of government. Furthermore, the claim was made that the Iraqi people did not want an Islamic state, but rather, a form of government where all the actors can participate, as long as the Muslims are respected.

What was even more insightful was Abdul-Jabbar Al-Rifai's emotional outcry, out of his experience in a recent visit to Iraq, about the miserable conditions the Iraqi people are currently living in, and has been suffering for decades.

He added to the conference a much-needed personal account as he warned the audience thatb Iraqis should be able to decide for themselves when it comes to resistance. Resistance should not come as such, he believes, for Iraqis have been deprived of basic necessities and endured many hardships for the past three decades.

The final section of the program 'saved' the forum in the sense that it represented what is the most pertinent and relevant today.

One of the most crucial questions many of us ask is what kind of leadership will the Iraqis have in the near future? What form of 'democracy' or representative government? I put the term democracy above in quotes because it is debatable. Just look how democratic a power structure can be if it is imposed externally rather than elected within Iraq.

Nevertheless, both the Lebanese and the Bosnian cases were presented as models of power-sharing along confessional lines and partition respectively, as well as Switzerland's nonethnic federation, despite religious cleavages.

Even though the Iraqis are not dealing with civil strife but rather with foreign occupation, it is always important to present alternative models of rules.

Faleh Abdul-Jabar's contribution was particularly informative as he dealt with the evolution of the Iraqi monarchy before 1954 when groups and social classes were the basis of self-definition and unification. The consequent transformation into a paradoxical totalitarianism of the lower middle classes then followed and reverted to the tribalistic ties that they were supposedly critical of.

Now that the American authorities are administering Iraq, Abdul-Jabar claimed that their humiliation has been intensified.

It is unfortunate that such a despotic regime had to be removed by a foreign power (which had its own strategic, economic interests, of course) instead of an Arab country closer to it.

Abdul-Jabar added his deep feeling that it is a strong sense of Iraqi nationalism and self-respect that has brought about this sense of shame and resistance to the government that is being set up, which has more power than an interim government, but no power at all over administrative issues of reconstruction, the bureaucracy and reorganizing the police force and the army.

Needless to say, at the end of this conference there was an overall sense of unrest towards the ruthless manner in which former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was deposed, as well as a somehow naïve hope that Iraqis can have a better future without foreign intervention.