Former premier describes sectarianism as the obstacle to reform, democratic system

Hoss retells how he combated the nation’s malady when he was entrusted to the premiership

BEIRUT - Alternative Staff

December 2003

Former Prime Minister Salim Hoss said there would never be reform until the nation rids itself of sectarianism, which is also an obstacle to the growth of a real democratic system in the country.

In a book entitled Us and Sectarianism, published by All Prints earlier this year, Hoss argued that sectarianism was Lebanon’s first and foremost problem. “A lot of times, it obstructs fairness, equality and equal opportunity among citizens. It is an obstacle on the way of efforts of respecting human rights,” Hoss wrote.

Hoss, a five-time prime minister who was elected Beirut MP in 1992 and 1996 but lost his bid for Parliament in 2000, added a few articles to a compilation of chapters from his different previous books. Chapters were selected to reflect the former premier’s secular practices while in power.

The book’s style is exceptionally inviting and entertaining when Hoss retells stories from his first days in power when he was first selected Prime Minister in 1976 under late President Elias Sarkis who ruled between 1976 and 1982. However, the book becomes in some parts redundant when Hoss opts to disclose excessive analysis on the issue.

Another drawback is the former official’s choice to withhold his “sectarian” experiences when he headed President Emile Lahoud’s first government between 1998 and 2000. About this period, Hoss restricts his opinion to saying that Lahoud is by no means sectarian.

According to Hoss, sectarianism in Lebanon is equated with lying. “No one says of himself a liar inasmuch as no one says of himself as being a sectarian propagator,” he wrote, adding that all sects claim that their sectarian behavior is a reaction to other groups.

He added that even the first post independence government, headed by late Prime Minister Riad Solh, drafted a verbal “National Convention” that specified the share in power of each one of the nation’s 18 sects. He said, however, that even Solh’s cabinet disclosed in its governmental statement in 1943 that it sought to put an end to sectarianism in the country and the administration.

Hoss believes that sectarianism cannot be abolished through the issuance of a couple of decrees. It should be rather treated by slowly convincing people to abandon such practices.

Hoss recounts when he was first entrusted to head the government under Sarkis in 1976. Hoss argues that his first encounter with sectarianism was when the government intended to accept the resignation of several army officers on allegations of acting without orders.

He said that former Foreign and Defense Minister Fouad Butros aimed at accepting resignation of Muslim officers such as Lieutenant Ahemd al-Khatib, famous for commanding the pro-leftist army faction known as Lebanon’s Arab Army, while at the same time sparing pro-rightist officers such as pro-Israeli Major Saad Haddad and Colonel Fouad Malek, known for forming the Lebanon’s Army faction.

“They told me that the group called Lebanon’s Army fought on the side of the president and with the knowledge of the former Army Commander General Hanna Said,” said Hoss, adding that he believed all of this groups, including the army commander, acted without orders from the political authority and should have been punished.

But Hoss offered convincing arguments about his secular dealing with country affairs. According to the veteran politician, a promotion of judges who passed the Judicial Institute exam was comprised of 11 Christians and only three Muslims. Hoss inquired about what would be done in such cases and was told that he should wait until round two of exams supplies enough number of candidates for judicial posts.

The Prime Minister refused to go by the sectarian convention in appointments and insisted to sign a decree in which he appointed those who succeeded in the judicial exam under the pretext of appointment according to merit.

Hoss then extensively talked about the increasing sectarian behavior of Sarkis and how the president favored the rightist-Christian wing during the civil war. According to Hoss, Sarkis always felt that he did not enjoy enough popularity among Christians and that he relied on traditional and militia leaders when taking his decisions.

The Beiruti politician, who exited power in 1980 but stayed in Beirut during the Israeli invasion of the capital in 1982, talks about how the interim government he headed managed the Lebanese crisis, which was aggravated by the appointment of former Army Commander General Michel Aoun head of an interim military cabinet in 1988.

Hoss argues against the constitutional legitimacy of Aoun’s government as he retold the story of the division of the Lebanese authority into one Muslim government in West Beirut and another Christian cabinet in Eastern Beirut.