July 15, 2007
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Excerpts from the July 2007 Brammertz Report
Compiled by Alternative Staff

- The commission continues its obligation to protect the confidentiality of its investigation (to ensure the integrity of the legal process and to protect those who have provided information and assistance).

- The commission’s work will be transferred to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Lebanon.

- Consolidation of the over all work of the commission produced comprehensive confidential consolidated reports including a 2000-page report on its investigation of the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

- A single blast was caused by an above-ground charge consisting of approximately 1,800 KG detonated at 12:55:05

- Mitsubishi van was reported stolen in Japan in October 2004. It was sold in a showroom close to Tripoli in December 2004.

- The IED was most likely triggered by a suicide bomber. The commission was able to establish a list of limited number of countries where the suicide bomber could originally be from.

- Three digital visualization projects have been completed to assist investigators to get a clear picture of Beirut and the crime scene, the route taken by the convoy and the movements of Rafik Hariri during his last Days (including the alleged communications traffic activity of the bomb team as the convoy proceeded along its route).

- The crime scene was released and the road re-opened.

- Bank Al-Madina scandal was not a principal motive for the assassination.

- While some events surrounding the adoption of resolution 1559 need to be further investigated, the commission’s working hypothesis is that it is likely that these events played an important role in shaping the environment in which the motives to assassinate Rafik Hariri emerged.

- The commission has reached a satisfactory understanding of the overall role and position of various political actors during the period, sequence of events which led to the vote to extend Lahoud mandate, and the impact this could have had on the motive to carry out the attack.

- The commission has further focused on reviewing its holdings regarding the new electoral law being discussed during the period under examination and its impact on the different political formations contending the 2005 parliamentary elections including Rafik Hariri’s. The commission has also focused on the perception of possible outcomes held by different parties in Lebanon and elsewhere, the basis for such perceptions and their relevance to the investigation.

- It can not be excluded that the motives to assassinate Hariri could have arisen from a combination of political and sectarian factors.

- The commission has identified a number of persons of particular interest who may have been involved in some aspects of the preparations and commission of the crime or could have had prior knowledge that such a plan was under way.

- Evidence and statements collected by the commission and by the Lebanese authorities indicate that the choice of the date of the Ain Alaq attack, eve of the second anniversary of the Rafik Hariri assassination, may however be connected with the motives of the attack.

- The commission has also dedicated its holdings and understanding of the public stance taken by victims of other assassinations regarding several of the major events which shaped the Lebanese political landscape in recent years including, among others, 1559, extension of Lahoud, assassination of Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. This analysis has revealed both interesting commonalities as well as some potentially relevant difference in the position taken by the individuals targeted.

- Security situation in Lebanon may impact: work and investigations of the commission, security of the commission’s staff, cooperation of witnesses and the commission’s ability to attract qualified staff.