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An Uprising within the Uprising
By Samir Kassir
Annahar
- April 1, 2005
Perhaps the local Lebanese need to be distanced
from the routine of following the daily events in order to
sense the thirst for answers that is mostly felt by those
Lebanese living abroad and thus realize the missing angles of
this historical moment and become concerned about how to
achieve its full potential.
Whether traveling to
Europe or the Arab Gulf, the person coming from
Beirut is greeted with a mixture of pride, zeal,
curiosity, doubt and fear.
He soon notices that the fear sensed by
expatriate Lebanese does not only spring out of what they hear
about the series of bombings, but out of doubting "the
Lebanese politician," whoever this politician might be. One
would eventually find himself pushed to reshape his
understanding of independence in a way that goes beyond its
direct political dimension especially that whenever he returns
to his daily follow-up on events, he senses the beginning of a
disappointment that reaffirms that daily politics have not
grasped the size of the achievement they helped produce.
It might be still early to question the
opposition while the battle is not over yet. Criticizing this
opposition might also be ill-placed after it came up with a
new comprehensive statement that could be described as good on
the overall even if it fell short of living up to the historic
moment. Still, it might be necessary, during this transitional
phase, to assess what has been called, and rightly so, the
Independence Uprising (Intifada in Arabic). The statement
issued yesterday by the opposition did not do that, despite
the fact that it was released in the first meeting held after
the March 14 unprecedented protest and after it has become
certain that Syrian troops and the Baath regime intelligence
in Lebanon were withdrawing in such a speed that makes of this
withdrawal/victory a huge historic event.
As for the March 14 protest, not much has been
said about it, or not what was supposed to be said anyway.
First, looking at net figures, this protest has been the
biggest opposition demonstration in modern Arab history
(excluding national events sponsored by authorities, funeral
demonstrations whether that of Abdul-Nasser, Um Kalthum or
Abdul-Halim). In relative terms, i.e. relative to the number
of resident inhabitants, this demonstration might be one of
the biggest in world history that compares only to the summer
of the French Revolution in 1789 and the days of March and
November of 1917 during the two Russian revolutions and when
the Iranian people took to the street in autumn 1978 and
winter 1979. This alone deserves a moment of reflection,
perhaps a stance of modesty on behalf of everyone. Since what
one third of the Lebanese people did on that day was a
confirmation of the independence status that the country had
been living, which is far greater than any single one of those
who contributed in making it or tried leading it. It was even
bigger that the sum of the efforts of all of them put
together, no matter what their role was in the past or the
present.
As for the event of the speedy exit of the
Syrian forces, not enough has been said about this either. Was
it because this event was too good to be true? Or because the
remains of the security system, which the Syrian intelligence
left behind, have obscured the vision? Anyway, the joy has
been missed while citizens, and those who are trying to lead
them, almost failed to notice that a new page has been opened
in Lebanese history and that this page requires a new kind of
reading, or let's say a quality of reading different from that
inspired by the calculation of sizes within the circles of the
opposition.
There is no need now to refute some selfish
behavior of X or Y in the opposition or to cite the mistakes
that Y or Z had committed. The current independence status
needs political expression with a parliamentary extension.
Yet, we cannot but pause and look at the signals of
dissatisfaction that society is sending to the opposition at
large. And perhaps the first of these signals is related to
the absence of an assessment of true sizes and particularly
the estimation of the biggest size in the opposition formula,
the size of the people in the street whether in its small
organized part in political parties, organizations and
movements or in its greater unorganized part.
For it is not normal that the opposition waits
more than two weeks to hold its first public meeting to
evaluate what happened on March 14th and salute those who made
it possible.
It is also not normal to let this day's popular
movement disperse even if it's hard to keep it at its current
climax. It becomes as if it [the opposition] is telling
citizens: Well done. Go home now. We will call if we need you!
Another signal of popular dissatisfaction is
related to the absence of a clear mechanism for decision
making and setting the sails as has been evident in the
individual behavior seen in more than one public event and on
sensitive issues related to the fate of the president of the
republic whose term has been extended or to that of "the arms
of the resistance" which means Hizbullah maintaining its
military branch and the state inside the state that Hizbullah
is currently guarding. Add to this the vague stance until
yesterday on the cabinet crisis. The climax of this vagueness
was attained when one of the opposition poles suggested,
through a satellite television, a candidate for the
premiership; the least that could be said about this nominee
is that he occupies a dark spot in the Lebanese collective
memory. But the biggest source of dissatisfaction might be the
citizens feeling that the moment of victory coincided with a
moment of reaping the fruits rather than starting anew.
While there are a number of people, who seem to
possess a vision for the future and good discipline, the image
of the opposition seems threatened as there are many
opposition figures who only care about being in the right
place at the right time whether there presence is related to
parliamentary or presidential elections. It is true that there
is a fine line between the attempt to broaden the opposition
bloc by making the loyalist blocs fall apart, and the need for
a new discipline in public life.
Yet, it is not impossible to reach a middle
ground by giving former loyalists a chance to catch up on
their past mistakes, without allowing them to insult citizens'
memory by pretending to play leading roles in the opposition,
especially when it comes to the formation of tickets for the
upcoming parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, it is
unacceptable for the opposition to give itself the image of
the club of candidates to parliamentary elections. Even if
Lebanon's parliament needs new blood, this does not mean that
under the banner of renewing political life, the opposition
makes citizens feel that all opposition figures are position
seekers.
And what is said about the parliamentary
elections market also applies to presidential elections. Even
with the adjournment of this issue, it remains shameful to see
that after this uprising, some of those who are running for
the presidency are the same ones known for their endless
defense of "the unity of [peace] track and [Lebanon's and
Syria's] destiny" and for their indifference to the
suppression of the national will in governing Lebanon's
foreign and domestic affairs. Doesn't it feel suspicious that
every Maronite politician feels, time and again, that he is a
nominee to these elections only by virtue of being born into
this sect? Isn't the marketing for presidential candidates
"who have not been in the opposition for more than ten years"
or whose nomination is merely a challenge an obstruction to
the building of a state that respects its citizens?
Are these early questions? No, fellow comrades in the
opposition, whether you are new or veterans, take to the
streets and you will hear it. You will hear with it a call for
you to take the initiative for an uprising of a different
kind, an uprising against the self that would - in the
aftermath of the end of the Baath regime's mandate - pave the
way to the building of a modern state, a state of citizens and
not a state of subjects.
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