One million give March 14 another chance

In his Feb. 14 speech, Walid Jumblatt waived all of the taboos and made out of them material for national debate

By Shadi Hannoush

March/April 2006

BEIRUT: What next is a legitimate question after this huge popular mandate on Feb. 14, 2006.

For the first time in history a revolution takes place but the retrospective effect of this revolution yields more results than the revolution itself.

Feb. 14 came after a year of assassinations, compromises and concessions. It came a year after the March 14 forces took over the "non authority." No one could have possibly thought that the people will show this kind of enthusiasm and renew their commitment. No one could have possibly thought the people would take to the streets this time with a clear political choice rather than emotional impulses and beneficiary calculations. People took to the streets shouting "Lahoud get out." This is to say that the goal was clear: The destruction of the last strongholds and claws of the Syrian regime in Lebanon.

At this point, we should look at this scene from two angles: One of the citizens and another one of the leading forces. The people have given a mandate to the March 14 forces to lead, which makes the responsibility for these forces even bigger. The nation's citizens have called their shots: No further compromise. This means that the March 14 forces should not even contemplate entering any deals or compromises at the expense of the choice of these citizens.

The speeches on Feb. 14 of the three leaders Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea were coordinated and led to laying the basis for a joint platform for future steps.

The Saad Hariri speech clearly illustrated that the international and Arab support of Lebanon is unlimited and that this support will not stop, not now or in the near future. In his speech too, Hariri was firm on his strategic options: The Arab initiative is now on hold facing the Syrian stubbornness in refusing the Lebanese demands. This in turn, has decreased the Saudi and Egyptian opposition to the Lebanese escalation against Syria. Hariri's choice is also based on the support of the superpowers to Lebanon facing all the possible obstacles including its protection against possible sabotage of the Syrian regime.

As for Jumblatt's speech, one cannot but notice that Jumblatt's words form a clear political platform that aims at taking over power. In his speech, Jumblatt identified the problems and put them on the table. In his speech too, Jumblatt waived all of the taboos and made out of them material for debate.

He also resolved his position as he stood at the point of no return in the battle with the Syrian regime and that this regime should never be allowed to come back to Lebanon, whatever the price for keeping this regime out of Lebanon would be.

No one can, after this speech, to settle for less than these demands in which Jumblatt said that there is no independence or sovereignty at the time security has been contracted to certain militias. At this point, Jumblatt seems to have tackled the main concern for which people had come to the Freedom Square: Security. Jumblatt also said that there will be no security or stability at the time arms enter the country without any restrictions and that there will be no security either in the presence security squares outside authority control.

The people had come to Freedom Square to say that it was unacceptable for anyone to shoot at any Lebanese citizen, that the state is the only authority that protects citizens and that there is no need for special security or another army other than the Lebanese army.

Jumblatt's speech was very important that it should form the basis for the consensus among the March 14 groups.

Meanbwhile, Geagea's speech was aimed at the heart of the Maronite community sending a message that the presidency was not reserved for a single person and that the formula of either Aoun president or immigration does not stand. Here too, people proved to be judging politicians based on their rhetoric and the stances of Aoun that completely changed over the course of one year has affected his Maronite popularity.

In his speech, Geagea revitalized his following and send Aoun the message that the Christian population could be either divided between their parties, or that he would say in front of the one million that the "presidency is ours." This in turn has two meanings: First that the president will not come from outside March 14 and second, no one can impose his agenda on the country.

Accordingly, a big responsibility falls on Geagea since he is expected to talk to the Christians while at the same time lead them out of their closed community to the wider national space.

The Feb. 5 burning of the Denmark embassy in Beirut sped up the meeting between Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah which was supposed to happen last year after Aoun had returned from exile had it not been for Jumblatt going to Hizbullah and striking a mutual electoral alliance. At the time, Jumblatt also used unwanted language when he described the March 14 alliance with Hizbullah as breaking the sectarian barrier, as if March 14 was a sectarian gathering.

But when Aoun started his alliance, he most probably had in mind that he would be the compromise candidate of Syria-Iran and the US and he also believed that his joint declaration with Hizbullah would offer the Americans some Syrian and Iranian concessions that he can sell to the Americans and then, Lahoud would be removed, to the satisfaction of March 14, and he would become president. The whole of the Aoun scenario was undermined by the US before it even came to reality.

For his part, Nasrallah believed that he needed an ally that has not yet accused Syria of all the crimes starting with the crime of the century (the assassination of Hariri) and ending with that of Gebran Tueni. Nasrallah also thought (the Syrians and the Iranians also thought with him) that Aoun could take the Christian street wherever he pleased no matter under what political slogan. This proved to be shortsighted as it underestimated the diversity in the Christian street and the available freedom for Christians – across decades – have always been more open and diversified than all other sects in Lebanon.

The response to Nasrallah, like that to Aoun, came fast and in the form of one million people who did not leave any room for doubt that the majority of the Lebanese people support March 14 and that the "defectionist Aounists" do not matter when it comes to numbers.

All of this said, the bottom line is that 33 percent which is a high percentage has given a clear mandate to the parliamentary majority to take over power and start building the state.

Here, the majority bloc should realize that all the options are open including early elections and the expansion of the majority bloc, or the formation of a cabinet of majority only relying on popular support.

The cabinet is also expected to initiate national dialogue about the disarmament of Hizbullah, demand that the UN demark the Syrian-Lebanese borders even by force if need be, sending UN troops to the Shebaa Farms, and disarming the Palestinians outside the camps of their arms no matter what.

The cabinet should also form the Higher Judicial Council that works on comprehensively reforming the judiciary and dealing with all the saboteurs. This should come along the lines of imposing reform on all state institutions.

The March 14 forces are expected to reinforce the campaign for the impeachment of Lahoud and these forces should not relent before March 14. All of this should be coupled with more activity that would bring another million people again to the streets on March 14.

Shadi Hannoush is a member of the Democratic Left Movement. He wrote this article for Alternative