Syrian presence in Lebanon: Legitimate or Occupation?

Syrian presence has tipped the Lebanese balance in favor of the Shiites alone

DAMASCUS - Anonymous

BEIRUT - Salem Mazloum

BAGHDAD - Sami Orfali

WASHINGTON DC - Scott Lurie

February 2005

Syrian troops entered Lebanon in 1976 as a peacekeeping force, allegedly upon the invitation of the Lebanese authorities. The invitation was supposedly renewed again and again, whether upon Lebanon’s request or international mandates, giving ample time for the Syrian guest to meddle in all aspects of its weaker neighbor. In some instances, the Syrian intervention, whether through their military or through the assassination of their political rivals, changed the course of Lebanese history.

“Lebanon, in its present form, was the fruit of an accord between Maronite and Sunni notables in 1943, known as the National Accord, in which the Maronite gave up their anti-Arab rhetoric while the Sunnis renounced their demand of joining a greater Arab nation,” according to Faisal Moqdad, a Beirut-based analyst.

The 1943 agreement, however, had replaced an earlier accord between the Maronites and the Druze in Mount Lebanon, the ancestor of modern day Lebanon. The Druze were certainly left out of the deal.

“This was one of the reasons that made the Druze press for further affiliation with Arabism. Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze leader, became the proponent of the pan-Arab ideas of the then very popular Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul-Nasser,” the analyst added.

According to Moqdad, the division between the Arab-supported Jumblatt on one side and the Maronites and their weaker Sunni allies on the other, supported by the anti-Communist West, culminated in what came to be known as the 1958 revolution.

“The 1958 civil war was contained, however, as Nasser and Western countries agreed on keeping Lebanon out of Arab-Western divisions,” said Antoine Harb, a graduate student in political studies.

“The honey moon in Lebanon extended between 1958 and 1975, when the Lebanese were divided once again,” Harb added. “This time, their division was over what was viewed as Maronite monopoly of domestic politics, and the difference over the support of Palestinian operations against Israel launched from Lebanon,” he argued.

Along these differences, the Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975.

Meanwhile, Syria, the first Arab country that witnessed a military coup d’etat in 1949, saw the tightening of the grip of a Baathist Party military regime beginning 1970s. Established in the 1930s and styled over Europe’s fascist and chauvinist parties, the Arab Baath Socialist Party believes in uniting the Arab people, “from the Gulf to the Ocean,” under one socialist rule. The party’s pan-Arab rhetoric has given its dictator endorsers the pretext needed for the meddling of one dictator in the affairs of other Arab countries. In Syria’s case, Syrian rulers never stopped interfering in Palestinian, Lebanese and Iraqi affairs.

The Baathist rulers of Iraq were competing with Syria’s Baathist in funding their cronies around the Arab world and assassinating their rivals. “This policy was first championed by Nasser himself in the 1950s and 60s,” Haidar Said, a Baghdad-based journalist, told Alternative.

Since the accession of the two rival Baath parties of Iraq and Syria to rule their countries in the late 1960s, they’ve competed for dominance around the Arab world. Lebanon, a weak and divided neighbor, was the arena for this competition throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.

Lebanon and Syria were not the only parties fighting over Lebanese soil. “Israelis were chasing Lebanon-based Palestinian fighters. The Americans were hunting down Soviet-supported groups. Libya was looking for cronies in Lebanon and so on. With Islamic fundamentals taking over the rule in Iran in 1979 and their vow to liberate Palestine, Iran sponsored its own party as well,” said Moqdad.

“By 1985, there were rarely any group that didn’t swear allegiance to non-Lebanese masters,” he concluded.

“The winner of the Lebanese political and military Olympics was the one who had trained himself for marathons,” said a Syrian analyst who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of the retaliation of Syria’s secret police. “Through a combination of domestic Syrian tyranny, pragmatic international politics which saw Syria embracing the Soviet Union but at the same time taking orders from Washington, and the killing of Lebanese and Palestinian political rivals, Hafez Assad emerged as the only winner in the Lebanese civil war in 1990.”

Syria entered Lebanon, presumably upon the invitation of the Lebanese Christians, who sought protection against “Palestinian danger.” The non-Christian left, led by late Kamal Jumblatt, objected to what he saw as a Syrian attempt to protect the Maronite monopoly of the Lebanese political life. Jumblatt sought domestic reform and support of Palestinians.

When Jumblatt failed to comply with Syria’s designs, Syria killed him in 1977 and never claimed responsibility for his murder. By removing Jumblatt, Syria removed an obstacle to its dominance of Lebanon and secured the support of his followers.

But with the killing of Jumblatt, Syria was falling with its Christians allies. Military confrontations broke out and the Christians, led by Bashir Gemayel, sought Israeli intervention to rid Lebanon of Palestinian as well as Syrian military existence. When the Israeli-American-sponsored Bashir Gemayel finally prevailed and was elected president in 1982, against Syrian will, Syria assassinated him and maintained its existence in Lebanon after removing the second Lebanese popular leader who had asked for the withdrawal of its troops.

With the killing of popular leaders such as Druze Kamal Jumblatt, and Maronite Bashir Gemayel, and with the exile of less prominent Maronite leaders such as former Army General Michel Aoun and the imprisonment of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, the opposition to Syrian presence in Lebanon was totally removed.

While Kamal’s successor Walid cooperated with the Syrians after the conclusion of the civil war, the Maronites failed to come up with a strong leadership. Instead, Syria promoted a number of its unpopular Maronite cronies to bless its existence in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Syria was grooming and strengthening its alliance with a long politically ignored Lebanese community, the Shiites. By 1982, the Shiite Islamic Iran was also seeking Shiite clients in Lebanon, much to the discontent of Syria. This culminated in Syrian-backed Shiites, the Amal Movement, clashing with Iranian-backed Shiites, Hizbullah, several times until Iran gave up on this conflict. Consequently, Iran subcontracted the leadership of its funded and supported party to Syria.

Regionally and internationally, Syria sided with the United States in knocking Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein out of his regional influence in 1990. In reward, America turned a blind eye to Syrian existence in Lebanon.

With the Maronite leadership eliminated, the Druze leadership suppressed, the Sunni minor opposition to Syria taken away with the killing of Sunni Mufti Hassan Khaled, and the Shiite leadership support of Syria, Syria dominated Lebanon.

The Shiite-Syrian dominance in Lebanon lived as long as the Shiites monopolized the resistance to Israeli occupation of the South between 1978 and 2000. But with the Israeli withdrawal, the Shiite popularity and prominence was on the decline and the excuse for Syrian stay in Lebanon was taken away.

In addition to their favorite community, the Shiites, the Syrians gave an edge to their Maronite puppets over the more popular Sunni leader Rafik Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the Maronite leadership of Aoun, Geagea, and the traditional Gemayel, Chamoun and Muawwad families. The unfair Syrian tipping of the balance made all the Lebanese align themselves against its presence and its sponsor of the Shiites and the weak Maronite figures.

With the international community coming to the rescue of the opposition, Hariri, the man with the biggest international and regional influence and who is an anchor for any post-Syrian withdrawal period, was killed. “It looks like the Baathist regime is playing an all-or-non game in Lebanon telling the international community that the demise of its influence in Lebanon means its virtual death and that this won’t pass easily,” the anonymous Syrian analyst concluded.